The role of nontraded goods has received considerable attention from economists attempting to assess the relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes. The traditional view is summarized in McKinnon's [10, 719] statement: "...if we move across the spectrum from closed to open economies, flexible exchange rates become both less effective as a control device for external balance and more damaging to internal price stability.
Yet, as is widely recognized, the classification of goods into traded or nontraded depends upon the exchange rate. If an economy is not in long-run equilibrium, its position on the spectrum from closed to open economies will depend, in part, upon current exchange rate policy.
While there is little debate that changes in the exchange rate will change the line of demarkation between traded and nontraded good sectors, there is substantial controversy concerning the effects of the exchange rate on the allocation of resources between sectors. One view is that floating rates, inhibit international trade and investment; the net effects leading to fewer resources in the export sector and more resources being allocated to the import competing and, presumably, nontraded good sectors. Aliber [1, 178] presents evidence that floating rates have increased exchange risk, price risk, and hedging costs by a factor of five to ten. This evidence is used to support the argument that: "Increased uncertainty about exchange rates is likely to lead to a reduction in international transactions relative to domestic transactions, and so production is less specialized internationally; the analogy is to a tax, however modest, on international transactions..." When the exchange rate is • considered to be an endogenous variable, Aliber's argument loses some of its force. Flexible rates might encourage trade if the primary cause of exchange rate variability is external price instability.
Another view stems from the observation that a change in the exchange rate alters the relative price of,commodities. These relative price changes will serve as .signals to resource owners so that flexible rates will induce resource movements betwen sectors. Again, in assessing this argument, it is necessary to consider the type of disturbance producing the exchange rate changes.
Kreinen and Heller [6] , and Lanyi [8] argue that if disturbances originate in the capital account, any resulting exchange rate changes can induce socially wasteful changes in the allocation of resources. However, Thursby [13] argues that exchange rate changes will lead to a reallocation of resources only if the induced relative price changes are deemed to be of a permanent nature.
In an indirect test of this proposition, using a mix of empirical and simulation techniques, Ihursby finds: "In a majority of our simulations we find no significant difference in export variation under fixed and flexible rates..."
In our recent paper in this journal [2] , we argued that there is greater pressure for resource movements between sectors with fixed rates than with flexible rates. Although resource allocations were assumed to be exogenous, it was shown that price formation of nontraded goods is fundamentally different under the alternative exchange regimes. The model used postulates that commodity demands depend, in part, upon the domestic money supply and that the money supply is constant with flexible rates but serially correlated (through the balance of payments mechanism) with fixed rates.-^As such, the demand for and price of nontraded goods will be serially correlated with fixed rates but not with flexible rates. On this basis we argued that resource allocations to the nontraded goods sector (and hence the traded goods sector) should be serially correlated with fixed rates but not with flexible rates, regardless of the source of disturbances. and expected utility will be invariant to the exchange regime. In the presence of nontraded goods it is shown; 1) With flexible rates, the amount of resources allocated to any one sector will be constant over time. With fixed rates, resource allocation will respond to circumstances within the domestic and foreign economies. This is in contrast to the view that flexible rates lead to more variability in resource allocations than fixed r a t e s .
2) The size of the nontraded goods sector is dependent upon the exchange regime. A fixed rate acts to increase the average size of the nontraded goods sector at the expense of traded goods so that more resources are allocated to traded goods with flexible rates than with fixed rates. T^e view that the preferred exchange regime depends upon the degree of openness" must be modified when the size of traded and nontraded goods sectors are endogenous. Our results also challenge the view that flexible rates expand the import-competing sector and contract the export sector.
Section II describes the model, derives the optimal decision rules for individual agents, and considers aggregate macroeconomic equilibrium. Maximizing with respect to the yields the nominal demands for commodities during retirement:
it +l^it+l~®i"*t+lG iven these consumption rules, the individual will select c^^and during period t in order to maximize: .Lastly, under any exchange regime, commodity arbitrage requires:
where e is the domestic currency price of the large country's currency. Under fixed rates, e is fixed (for convenience at unity) while under flexible rates the money supply is constant so that = Nm^= M. Under fixed rates P. = P* and P_ = P* , while under flexible rates the relative price ratio of traded goods is~relative price"ratios of traded goods are invariant to the exchange regime, and flexible rates will not be^ble to insulate an economy from external disturbances.
In order to highlight the role of nontraded goods, in Section III we assume that 0^is zero: in essence there are two traded goods. We demonstrate that fixed and flexible rates are "identical" as long as there is no nontraded goods sector. Section III serves as a reference, point for Section IV, which reintroduces nontraded goods.
III. , The Completely Open Economy
In Since v^and the a^^are independent of the exchange regime, the solution for the will be invariant to the exchange regime. Clearly, flexible rates do not act to contract the export sector and expand the import-competing sector: relative prices are equally variable under either exchange regime.
Because the productivity disturbances are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and independently distributed, inspection of equation 18) indicates that the amounts of labor allocated to each good will be time independent. In this regard, our results are in accord with those of Thuraby. Any relative price change in period t does not convey any information concerning prices in t+1.
As such, individuals do not perceive price change in t to reflect a permanent change. Labor allocations respond to the distributions of the a^^and a*^.
Resources will only move between sectors if there are changes in the distribution of the productivity disturbances.
Given that labor supplies are constant and invariant to the exchange regime, it is possible to demonstrate that expected utility levels are invariant to the exchange regime. Using the commodity demand functions and equation 9, the utility of a member of generation t will be:
= 0^1n(6^y^/2Pj^^) + * BjlnĈ e2l"(Vt/2P2t+l^ (19) where: + '^2t''2t output of good 3 are zero.
Since rearrangement yields "t • = 21n(y^/P^^) + 2e^ln(0^/2) + 202ln(e2/2) -+ ®2ln(Plt+l/P2t+l) • * "^"^It "^"^It+l Note that the term = ®lt^lt *^c^2t^2t invariant to the exchange regime since labor supplies, output disturbances, and relative prices are identical under fixed and flexible rates. Fischer [3] , Laffer [7] , and Mundell [11] have argued that fixed rates should be used if disturbances are real and internal, while flexible rates are preferable, if disturbances are external. "Hie essence of the argument is that flexible rates insulate an economy from external disturbances while internal will be contained within the domestic economy. With fixed rates, external disturbances will alter domestic prices, but individuals can save (via the balance of trade/payments mechanism) when domestic output is randomly high in order to consume when output is low. Our result showing that individuals are indifferent to the exchange regime (regardless of the source of disturbances)
stems from two sources,-^Recall that relative prices are invariant to the exchange regime in a world of two traded goods: flexible rates no more insulate the economy from relative price movements than do fixed rates.
Secondly, in the context of the intergenerational model, individuals can save that the small country experiences a payments surplus in t-1, the working generation in period t will anticipate a relatively large demand for commodities. As. the only price which can be affected is the nontraded good's price, the working generation in t will allocate more labor to nontraded goods than if there had been payments equilibrium in period t-1. Under flexible rates, however, the money supply is constant over time. As such, labor allocations will be time dependent in a fixed rate system and time independent under flexible rates. In the absence of a nontraded goods sector, a balance of payments surplus in t-1 will have no effects upon relative prices that prevail Adding 26a and 26b, and recalling that Z 1 = 1, the solution for labor i=l in the nontraded goods sector is:
Using 27) and either 26a or 26b, the solution for 1^^is given by the value of such that:
In many respects, the labor allocation decision with flexible rates and nontraded goods is similar to our results in Section III above. Since a^^and serially uncorrelated, labor allocations to the traded goods sector and 1^^) will be constant over time. This is to be contrasted to fixed rates for which it will be shown that labor allocations are time dependent. In addition:
i) The solution for 1^^(and thus l^j.) will depend upon the distributions of the domestic and foreign output disturbances. Thus, the distribution of foreign outputs (prices) will affect the domestic economy, even if the exchange rate is flexible. Flexible rates do not insulate the domestic economy from external disturbances, ii) Since equation 28) is not linear, specialization will not occur in reference to only the mean of the probability distribution.-^''
Suppose that the small country has a comparative advantage in the ex ante sense that ECa^^) < E(a^^) = E(a*^) = E(a*^). As we demonstrate in the next section, the country may allocate more labor to good 2 if the variance of good 2 is low relative to that of other goods.
iii) It is the ratios of the domestic to foreign distubances which are important. As such, if a^^is distributed as and a*^is distributed as allocations to each of the two traded goods sectors will be equal (1^^= 1^^-(1 -02)/2). If the domestic economy is uniformly more or less variable than the rest of the world, labor allocations will not change.
Under fixed exchange rates, the situation is quite different. Substitute equations 13, 15, and 16 into 12a and 12b to obtain:
Given the money supply in t and the distribution of a^^and a*^, equations 29a and 29b can be solved for 1^^. 1^^, and (as tl = l)^^. However, with a fixed exchange rate, the money supply will not be constant over time. Of particular importance is the fact that the money supply at t is in the information set of the working generation in t at the time the labor supply decision is made.
Note that lagging equation 14) one period yields the money supply at t (m^. or Nm^.) in terms of events in t-1. Thus, in marked contrast to flexible rates, the solutions for the 1^^will be changing over time if the exchange rate is fixed. As opposed to the results of Kreinen and Heller, Lanyi, and Thursby, there is more variation in resource allocations with fixed rates than with flexible rates.
In equations 29a and b, the expectations operator runs over the a^^and a*b
ut not the or -the 1^^are choice variables and is in the information set at t. Given the distributions of the a^^and inspection of 29a shows that the larger is m , the smaller is the sum of 1^^and l2^(i.e., the greater is 13^.)* The greater the current value of the money supply, the larger the expected output of the nontraded good (from equation 3, q^^3 t^3t^* " money supply is above its mean value, workers anticipate the above average demand for the nontraded good and allocate more labor to that sector.
As labor allocations are time dependent when the exchange rate is fixed, questions.concerning the effects of the exchange regime on sector size must be * answered in reference to average (or expected) sector size. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to explicitly solve for the expected labor allocations unless the distributions and realizations of the productivity disturbances are specified. We tackle this problem in Section V by simulating the model using Monte Carlo techniques.
V. Simulating the Model
As shown above, under flexible exchange rates the allocation of labor to each of the traded goods will depend upon the distributions of the domestic and" foreign productivity disturbances. Under fixed rates, labor allocations to all three sectors will depend upon the distributions and realizations of.the productivity disturbances. The realizations of the productivity disturbances are important under fixed rates since the small country's money supply will respond to differences in realized outputs across countries.
Since labor allocations are not distribution-free, our simulation results are designed to be illustrative as opposed to definitive. We assume that all productivity disturbances are binomially distributed. In providing simulation results, we would like to be able to use a commonly used distribution. A second reason for using the binomial is its simplicity and concurrent savings in computer costs. Lastly, we have experimented with several multinomial distributionsj they yield the same qualitative results as the binonij.al.
While all productivity disturbances are assumed to be drawn from the allocations under fixed exchange rates: E(l^^). As allocations are time independent with flexible rates, they are reported as 1^. Table 1 indicates how labor allocations depend upon the share of nontraded goods in consumption It is assumed that all disturbances have a mean of unity and that 0^= 02. There is a 50% chance that any disturbance will take on the value of .5 and a 50% chance that it will be 1.5.
Since all distributions are identical, the labor allocations under flexible rates are such that l^" ©^^^d 1~^2~under fixed rates, 1^^= l2t' expected, the table shows that labor allocated to the nontraded goods sector is positively related to^0^under either regime. All else equal, the greater is 6^, the greater will be the demand for nontraded goods. respectively. It is also assumed that 6^= 62 = (1 -2. For fixed rates, labor allocations may not sura to unity because of rounding.
The column labeled « ,, shows the simulated value of the correlation L3,M coefficient between the money supply in a period and the amount of labor allocated to the nontraded goods sector in that period (as the money supply is constant, with flexible rates, there is not a corresponding column for the flexible rate case). The large value of the correlation coefficient supports the claim that the demand for nontraded goods is positively related to the domestic money supply. Agents respond by allocating more labor to the nontraded goods sector in periods for which the demand for the nontraded'good is expected to be above average. As the demand for the nontraded good is positively related to the money supply, labor allocated to this sector is also positively related to the money supply.
Perhaps the most striking result in Table 1 is that the average amount of labor in the nontraded good sector is greater (unless 9^= 0) with a fixed rate than with a flexible rate. Thus, fixed rates -on average -increase the size of the nontraded good sector. It cannot be claimed that flexible rates always allocate resources away from sectors in which there is exchange risk:
rather exchange risk is endogenous. Using equations 24) and 27), under flexible rates the price of the nontraded good is = 2M/a2^. The price of the nontraded good is singularly determined by the productivity disturbance in that sector. Domestic currency prices of traded goods [e P* and e P? ] are t^tell determined by conditions in both countries (see equation 25). With a fixed rate, the situation is reversed: traded goods prices are determined by productivity disturbances in the traded'good sector [P-,^= P* = 1/a^and P« .
«l*tl I t^2^~w
hile the price of the nontraded good depends upon current disturbances and (through the money supply effect) events in previous periods.
Risk-averse individuals, then, tend to allocate more labor to the nontraded good sector when the exchange rate is fixed than when the rate is flexible. It is the different channels by which prices are determined under the two regimes which lead to different price distributions and resource allocations. While not reported in the table, the price of the nontraded good was not found to be serially correlated with a fixed rate. When labor allocations are exogenous (as in Enders and Lapan [2] ), prices will be serially correlated. In a rational expectations framework with serially uncorrelated productivity disturbances and "costless" labor reallocations, labor movements between sectors will tend to eliminate any predictability (serial correlation) in prices. Table 2 indicates how changes in the relative variability of foreign to domestic output disturbances alters labor allocations. The means of the productivity disturbances (both domestic and foreign) are all unity, but the variance of the foreign productivity disturbances increase as one reads down the table. As in Table 1 , in Table 2 we assume that domestic output disturbances have a 50% chance of taking on the value of .5 and a 50% change of being 1.5. Under flexible rates, all labor allocations are constant (1^= 9^, i = 1,3) over time. With fixed rates, the greater the variability of foreign to domestic output, the more labor is allocated to the nontraded goods sector.
Risk-averse individuals are acting to avoid the risks of foreign price variability by producing nontraded as opposed to traded goods. recall that from equation 15), invariant to the exchange regime. Uniformly increasing the variability of foreign prices affects this relative price equally in the two exchange regimes. Yet, the argument made previously remains in" force: with fixed (flexible) rates, the price of each traded (the nontraded) good is determined in a single market. The mean of all productivity disturbances are unity. The variance of all domestic disturbances is (.5). Also in the table, all 6^are equal to 1/3. Both foreign output disturbances have a .5 probability of taking on the value 1-Zor 1+Z. The variance of each foreign disturbance is (Z)^. All disturbances are uncorrelated.
In Table 3 we change the mean and variance of one of the traded goods (good 2 1. It is assumed that e-j^-8^~63~i/3. Further, all productivity disturbances, other than that of domestic production of good 2 have a mean of unity and variance of (.5)^.
2. The distribution of good 2 is such that it has a 50% chance of taking on values mean-Z and mean+E.
3.
The speciaii zaL ion coefficient is^^^ that iradable prices in the small country are invariant to productivity. If the mean disturbance of good 2 is low relative to that of good 1, individuals can allocate more labor to good I without altering the expected marginal value product.
Under flexible rates, the more labor allocated to a sector, the lower the expected price in that sector (of course, in equilibrium relative tradable prices will be invariant to the exchange regime). Thus, if the mean of the disturbance to good 2 is low (high) relative to that of good 1, less (more) labor will be allocated good 2 with a flexible rate.
From equations 12-15, labor allocations do not depend upon the distribution of the disturbances in the nontraded goods sector.-^Since it is the ratios of foreign to domestic disturbances which are important, it is not necessary to repeat Tables 2 and 3 for domestic and foreign disturbances respectively. Thus, Tables 1-3 be more open than economies with fixed rates. With flexible rates, the price of nontraded goods will primarily be determined by events in the nontraded goods sector, but tradable prices will be determined by domestic and foreign events. With fixed rates, however, tradable prices will be determined by foreign events while the price of the nontraded good will be determined by domestic and foreign events. Risk-averse individuals will allocate more resources to the nontraded good sector if the exchange rate is fixed. This, result contrasts with the argument that a flexible rate increases uncertainty and leads to less trade and specialization.
It has been claimed that flexible exchange rates lead to more interindustry resource movements than fixed rates. Our results argue the reverse:, resource allocations will be constant with flexible rates but responsive to the balance of payments when the exchange rate is fixed. The resource movements that occur with fixed rates, however, cannot be called While we believe that our model yields some interesting implications about resource allocation under fixed versus flexible rates, additional work needs to be done in this area. Under flexible rates, labor allocations were shown to be unchanging over time.
If we had assumed that productivity disturbances were serially correlated, labor allocations under either regime would be serially correlated. Uncorreiated disturbances were assumed in order to highlight the greater pressure for resource movements with fixed rates. We have also assumed a very specific form for the utility function. It would be desirable to extend our results to differing degrees of risk aversion and commodity substitutability. To date we have not been able to extend the results in this direction. Lastly, it would be of interest to introduce other factors of production and other stores of value into our framework. In spite of these qualifications, we believe that an intergenerational model of the sort developed in this paper yields several new insights into resource allocation under alternative exchange regimes.
tracLabi1ity we use a utility function for which the degree of relative risk aversion is unity. As such, we refrain from making normative conclusions about the exchange regimes.
Clearly the relevant labor supply decision is for^2 " fiince the demand for nontraded goods will be zero.
6. Differing degrees of relative risk aversion would alter this result; see footnote 4.
In essence, we extend Lapan and Enders [9] to a two traded goods world 7. Again, we remind the reader that the degree of relative risk aversion is important for this result. However, investigating the reasons why expected utilities are equal helps to clarify the labor allocation effects of the next section.
8. In the absence of nontraded goods, the exchange regimes yield identical labor allocations and expected utilities. Realized utility and the amount of each good consumed will depend upon the realizations of the productivity disturbances and the exchange regime. 9 . A similar result is obtained by Turnovsky [14] .
10. Hiis result depends upon the form of the utility function. If the elasticity of substitution differs from unity, labor allocations will depend upon disturbances in other sectors. We have not been able to solve the system for the case in which the elasticity of substitution differs from unity.
11. A table of these results has not been included in order to save space.
Interested readers are welcome to write for such tables and the computer program used to generate our simulation results. Furthermore, we have not reported the simulated values of the serial correlation for the price of the nontraded good. There was never any significant serial correlation in any of our simulations.
